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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade or so there has been a growing consensus that the climate change is a real 
problem. Estimates suggest that the global average temperature has increased with 0,75oC 
since 1900 and that it will continue to rise somewhere in the range of 1,1 and 6,4oC from 1990 
to 2100 (NOU, 2009:16). The International Panel on Climate Change (SFT, 2007) assesses 
that it is more than 90% probable that this development is caused by human activities through 
excessive emissions of climate gases, in particular CO2. According to the Stern Review 
(2006), the increase of the average temperature level may cause severe impacts on social and 
economic activity. The unambiguous conclusion of the report is that the benefits of immediate 
action outweigh the future costs of ignoring the development.  
 
It is emphasized both in the Stern Review and by the IPCC that technological innovation and 
advancements are essential in order to reduce emissions of climate gases. This concerns both 
abatement technology and renewable energy technology. As expressed by the IPCC:  
 
Climate change is one of the great challenges of the 21st century. Its most severe impacts may 
still be avoided if efforts are made to transform current energy systems. Renewable energy 
sources have a large potential to displace emissions of greenhouse gases from the combustion 
of fossil fuels and thereby to mitigate climate change. (IPCC, 2011, front page) 
 
National governments and supranational institutions have initiated measures supporting 
emerging renewable energy technology. In 2001 the European Union implemented the 
Renewable Energy Directive, which was replaced by a more comprehensive version in 2009. 
The intention is to reduce emissions of climate gasses, make member countries less dependent 
on imported energy and encourage technological innovation in the renewable energy industry. 
In the Renewable Energy Directive is a stated objective of increasing the share of renewable 
energy consumption to 20% of the total energy consumption in the EU within 2020.   
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The Norwegian government presented the white paper on climate efforts (klimameldingen) on 
the 26th of April 2012. The white paper builds on the 2008 agreement on climate policy 
(klimaforliket) where it was established an objective of reducing emissions with 30% within 
2020 compared to 1990 levels and of 2/3rds of these reductions being carried out in Norway. 
One of the measures stated in the white paper is the creation of a fund for climate, renewable 
energy and energy transformation. 
  
The Renewable Energy Directive has been implemented in Norway, but as is noted in the 
white paper (Mld. St. 21 (2011–2012)), the effects of further development of renewable 
energy will be limited as almost all of Norway’s energy consumption is produced by 
hydropower. However, it is also noted that the potential for further renewable energy 
development in Norway is significant and that there could be environmental benefits in 
increasing the renewable energy production.  
 
Specifically, it is pointed out that increasing the power surplus in Norway and the export of 
electricity from renewable energy sources may suppress production and thereby emissions 
from gas power and energy produced by combustion of fossil fuels in the importing countries. 
Furthermore, this increase in exports could back up renewable energy projects in other 
countries. On the hand, increased electricity production could increase consumption 
equivalently or reduce quota prices and thereby also the incentives to invest in green 
technologies. However, it is assumed that the effects on the quota prices would be limited 
given the size of the Norwegian energy production. 
 
In practice, green energy projects concerning onshore and offshore wind power, hydropower, 
solar power etc. require licenses granted by national authorities to be executed. This authority 
is executed by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) in Norway. 
The most common form of analysis performed to evaluate such projects is cost-benefit 
analyses (CBAs). Whenever the socio-economic benefits of a project outweigh the costs, the 
project is deemed welfare enhancing and granted a licence, and the application is denied when 
not.  
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However, regarding green technology projects, standard CBAs do not quantify and include 
one particular type of benefits: learning effects generated in the development of green 
technology by a specific firm which become freely available to other firms in the industry. 
The spillover of learning constitutes a market failure as the developers who incur the costs of 
generating knowledge through “learning-by-doing” are not compensated for their positive 
contribution to other developers. 
 
In this thesis an attempt is made of calculating and including learning effects in a CBA of a 
green energy project.   
 
In the first chapter a general presentation of cost-benefit analyses is provided. Main elements 
and considerations will be described, in addition to some criticism and practical shortcomings 
of this type of analysis.  
 
A presentation of the concept of learning curves is given in chapter two. A “learning curve” 
refers to a decreasing relationship between unit costs and accumulated production as a result 
of “learning by doing”. This learning effect is present in most production processes, but has 
important implications regarding green technologies when a certain degree of spillover is 
assumed, as noted above. Specifically, it will be argued that two market failures in the market 
for green technologies reduce the incentives to invest in emerging green technologies, these 
being the positive learning externality and a negative environmental externality generated in 
the production of substitutes. 
 
Presented in chapter three is a simple model of learning based on the learning curve 
methodology and optimal control theory. The model is of a global market for electricity 
which includes the market failures discussed in the previous chapter. In this model, the value 
of learning is set as the shadow price on the accumulated production, reflecting the increase 
in the present value of welfare when the accumulated production increases marginally. An 
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analytical expression for the value of learning generated in the production of green energy 
will be derived.  
 
By comparing the social planner’s solution and the market solution, it is shown formally that 
the provision of renewable energy is lower in the unregulated market relative to the first best 
solution. The optimal regulation is then analyzed in different scenarios and it will be 
discussed whether or not other policy rationales apply to green technologies compared to 
other innovations.  
 
Finally, a cost- benefit analysis of the Norwegian offshore wind power project Havsul I is 
performed in chapter four. Here the outcome of the analysis when learning is ignored and 
when learning is included will be compared. By applying the expression for the value of 
learning from the theoretical model it will be estimated how large the value of learning 
generated by the Havsul project will be. Given the model specification and the underlying 
assumptions, it is demonstrated that the Havsul project is estimated to yield a negative net 
present value in the cost-benefit analysis when socio-economic benefits from spillover of 
learning are ignored. However, the inclusion of value of learning in the cost-benefit analysis 
yields the opposite result, rendering the project a welfare enhancing undertaking. 
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1 Cost-benefit analysis  
Presented in this first chapter are the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis, main elements and 
considerations, and criticism and practical shortcomings of this type of analysis. This 
presentation is mainly based on the Norwegian Ministry of Finance’s guidelines for executing 
an (socio-) economic analysis (2005). Lastly, a practical example of a cost-benefit analysis is 
provided.  
 
1.1 The purpose of a cost-benefit analysis  
In accordance with the Norwegian Ministry of Finance’s guidelines for executing an 
economic analysis, the main purpose of such an analysis is to “explain, point out and 
systemize the consequences of measures and reforms before decisions are made” (FIN, 2005, 
p.8). Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the most common type of economic analysis. Briefly put, 
in a CBA one aims to measure all potential costs and benefits of a project in monetary units. 
If the benefits outweigh the costs, the project is welfare enhancing. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is based on welfare economics and the assumption that the society’s 
utility of a good can be measured as the aggregate willingness to pay for that good. Practical 
use of CBAs in public decision-making became widespread after the Second World War with 
demands for efficiency in government. Today, CBA is recognized as the key evaluation 
method for assessing public policy reforms and public investment projects according to 
OECD (2006). It could also be executed when public authority evaluates whether to give 
licences to privately funded projects with socio-economic repercussions such as energy 
projects. 
 
The costs and benefits in a CBA are measured in opportunity costs, defined as the cost of a 
resource measured by the value of the next-best alternative use of that resource. In a perfectly 
competitive market, the opportunity costs would be equal to the market prices and hence, a 
CBA would be superfluous because projects that would be profitable for the firms would be 
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profitable for the society as a whole. However, the existence of market failure such as market 
power, public goods, natural monopoly and externalities renders CBAs performed by public 
authority necessary. The reason is that the market prices in these cases do not reflect the 
consumers’ actual willingness to pay. For example, a wind farm project could prove to be 
profitable for the windmill producer, but as the producer has no incentive to take negative 
externalities such as noise and aesthetics into account, the project could turn out to give a net 
welfare loss when including these effects into a CBA.  
 
1.2 Main elements and considerations in a CBA 
A cost-benefit analysis includes all relevant aspects in case of executing a project. It identifies 
and describes all alternatives to the project, including the base alternative, usually defined as 
the most likely scenario if the public authority decides not to go forth with the project. It 
should also include the opportunity of a flexible solution, where carrying out the project 
piecewise is considered, in addition to an analysis of when to carry out the project. Postponing 
the project could reduce uncertainty as more information becomes available. Postponing is in 
this sense the opportunity cost of waiting and is known as option value, which is particularly 
important when the project entails irreversible consequences.  
 
Furthermore, it identifies all potentially affected parties and the effects they may experience 
due to the project, for example distributional effects and effects on various public budgets. 
Public projects and reallocation of resources will in general produce winners and losers. 
However, the losers may be compensated given that some of the generated surplus can be 
redistributed to the losers, which would give a potential Pareto-improvement. This is known 
as the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle.  
 
When all relevant aspects have been identified, the next step is to try to estimate the costs and 
benefits in monetary units. The opportunity costs on the factors of production and consumer 
goods are estimated based on market prices if these exist, corrected for market failures. If 
market prices do not exist, as is the case with public goods such as environmental benefits, the 
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marginal willingness to pay is estimated using stated preferences approaches (direct 
methods) or revealed preferences methods (indirect methods). These methods are applied to 
estimate the consumers’ willingness to pay for the public good by either asking them directly 
in a questionnaire or by indirectly estimating their willingness to pay by studying available 
market prices on goods that are substitutes or complementary to the good. An important 
difference between the two methods is that indirect methods give estimates of the use value 
only, while direct methods give estimates that include both use value and existence value. The 
latter is defined as the willingness to pay for goods that the individuals themselves cannot 
directly benefit from, such as the protection of endangered species or preservation of the 
rainforest. 
 
Sometimes, however, it may be impossible to estimate the consumers’ valuation of the good, 
or it may be that the resulting estimates do not give any meaningful information. In these 
cases the effects should be described and included in the analysis qualitatively only, according 
to FIN (2005). The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) (2003) do not 
recommend inclusion of environmental costs in CBAs of energy projects precisely on these 
grounds, but states that a simplified assessment should be made, called an environmental 
index. This index shows how large the environmental costs would have to be to give a zero 
net present value of the project. 
 
The costs and benefits of a project will in general not incur at the same point in time. The 
resulting estimates are therefore transformed into present value terms by discounting them in 
order to make them comparable. The project is socially beneficial if the net present value 
(NPV) is positive: 
(1)  =  ∑ 	, −  	, ∗  ()	,   (OECD, 2006) 
Here, B is benefits, C is costs, i is the ith individual and t denotes time. r is the social discount 
rate which reflects the loss in utility of postponing consumption and systematic risk. A 
socially beneficial project should in principle be executed, but various restrictions such as 
budget constraints can make this impossible. A common way of ranking different projects is 
to calculate the projects’ net present value divided by the present value of expenditures of the 
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project, and execute the projects one by one ordered from highest to lowest value until the 
budget is spent (FIN, 2005).  
 
The time aspect also makes it necessary to include risk in the analysis as the future is 
uncertain. Uncertainty is taken into account by calculating expected values, i.e. weighed sums 
of outcomes given the probability of the outcome. The social discount rate can be adjusted 
upwards if the risk is systematic, that is, if the benefits of the project are correlated to the 
economic cycle. However, the discount rate is unaffected by unsystematic risk, i.e. risk that is 
project specific and not cyclically sensitive. This type of risk will even out when a number of 
public projects are carried out, and instead it will affect the expected value of the project. The 
principal rule is to apply a constant risk adjusted discount rate. It is often appropriate to 
perform a scenario analysis and/or a sensitivity test to get a better grasp of the possible 
consequences of the project and its sensitivity to assumptions made, respectively. 
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2005) recommends a risk adjusted discount rate in 
public projects with moderate systematic risk of 4 %. This number may be adjusted upwards 
in the case of either two circumstances: high degree of cyclically sensitivity in demand and 
large fixed costs as share of total costs. As will be shown in the CBA of the offshore wind 
power project Havsul in chapter 4, the NVE applied a discount rate of 6,5% in the analysis of 
Havsul for both of these reasons.  
 
1.3 Criticism of CBA and practical shortcomings 
Even though the net present value of a project turns out to be positive, the project may not be 
socially desirable. It is noted in FIN (2005) that first of all, not all effects can be measured in 
monetary units in a reliable way, as mentioned above. Second, a CBA relies on the 
assumption that utility can be measured in money. However, a society’s willingness to pay 
does not necessarily include welfare effects entirely. The valuation of goods is different 
among individuals, and there exists no methods agreed upon professionally on how to 
compare utility between individuals. The reason is that all known methods are coloured by 
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some sort of subjective assessments which may affect the result (Nyborg, 2002). Third, a 
positive net present value does not say anything about distributional effects. This last 
shortcoming has to some extent been corrected for by including welfare weights in the 
analysis, giving higher weight to for example lower income groups (OECD, 2006). 
 
CBA has been criticized also theoretically on several accounts. In brief, the robustness of its 
theoretical foundation, the implicit welfare function underlying the analysis and the ethical 
problems entailed in a positive discount rate (thereby giving future generations a lower 
weight) have been and are still debated (OECD, 2006). Another critique on ethical grounds is 
to what extent individuals’ preferences should be the main guideline for social decision rules. 
One claim in this context is for example that living creatures and untouched nature have an 
“intrinsic value” which is independent of human preferences (see for example OECD (2006) 
and Gudding and Skonhoft (2008)). 
 
Hence, one should not base decisions solely on the results of a cost-benefit analysis, but it 
provides an important contribution in the decision-making process.  
 
1.4 Cost-benefit analysis – an example  
This section contains a summary of a cost-benefit analysis of further wind power 
development in Norway carried out by the research institute Møreforsking (2006).  
 
The context was the anticipated expansion in wind power development, where the 
contribution of wind power to the Norwegian power market was estimated to increase from 
0,9 TWh in 2005 to 7 TWh in 2020 by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE). The social profitability of this expansion is compared to the base 
alternative, which is set to be an equivalent expansion of hydro power instead. The potential 
for further development of hydro power exists and would be cheaper than further expansion 
of wind power, but the development is impeded by institutional obstacles according to 
Møreforsking. 
 
6 
 
Aesthetics, noise and conflict over location is identified in the report as the disadvantages of 
further wind power development. An important advantage is, on the other hand, the fact that 
hydro power and wind power generation are largely negatively correlated: 70 per cent of the 
wind power is generated during the winter months, when the inflow to the reservoir is at its 
lowest. Thus, wind power can provide an insurance against excessively high electricity prices. 
It is also pointed to alternative projects which can give the same insurance, such as improved 
transmission capacity, gas power plants and increased reservoir capacity.  
 
Individuals and industries which can be affected by the wind power expansion are identified 
to be the people living in proximity of the windmills, tourists and the tourist industry. The 
effect on the tourist industry may give strong spillover effects in the local economy in general 
as many local firms benefit from tourism. The effects can be either positive or negative, and 
will depend on whether the tourists have windmills in their own local environment and the 
purpose of the vacation (e.g. to experience untouched Norwegian nature).  
 
Much weight is put on the aspect of uncertainty in the analysis. Whether further wind power 
development will be profitable for the society is in large part dependent on milestones such as 
the Kyoto agreement and quota prices on CO2, in addition to the implementation of green 
certificates in Norway. Additional sources of uncertainty are the development of nuclear 
power and energy-intensive industries, and long term prices on fossil fuels. Given the level of 
uncertainty, the authors perform a scenario analysis with a “green” and a “brown” alternative 
where the quota price on CO2 is high and low respectively, to test if the expansion will be 
profitable in either case. 
 
Costs are quantified based on cost estimates by windmill producers given a production level 
of 7TWh. An expected market price on electricity equal to 0,3NOK/kWh renders wind power 
development unprofitable for private producers given their estimates on development costs 
equal to 0,3-0,4NOK/kWh. This number is estimated given an 8 % discount rate and 3000 
hour wear life. Wind power development is estimated to entail an excess cost of 
0,1NOK/kWh compared to hydro power, i.e. 0,7 billion NOK per year.  
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There are according to the authors of the report no estimates on the WTP to avoid 
environmental damages from wind power given the base alternative specifically. However, 
the authors deduce from public subsidies to wind power and from the level of conflict in 
handling procedures that wind power development is preferred to further development of 
hydro power1. 
 
It is concluded that the expansion to 7TWh is socially optimal under certain conditions, such 
as the probability of the “green” alternative in the scenario analysis being larger than 50 per 
cent. The authors recommend a flexible solution with moderate development of wind power 
today, and to postpone bigger decisions until more information about the new climate regime 
becomes available. 
                                                 
1
 “If the handling procedure is an indication of the environmental impact, it appears that, according with NVE, 
there is more resistance against hydro power projects, which can indicate that there is a larger willingness to pay 
to avoid development of hydro power than wind power.” (Møreforskning, 2006, p.13). (My translation) 
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2 Learning Curves 
Chapter two contains first a general presentation of the concept of learning curves. Then the 
implications of learning curves in the development of green technologies are elaborated on, 
given a market context which includes two market failures. Moreover, it is shown how 
positive externalities are handled in standard CBAs. Finally, some objections to the 
application of the learning curve methodology are presented.  
 
2.1 About learning and experience curves 
The basic idea behind learning curves is that the productivity of labour increases as a result of 
“learning-by-doing”. More specifically, when a firm starts producing a specific good the first 
units will be expensive, but as production proceeds and experience is gained, the workers 
competence is enhanced and unit costs fall. Hence, a learning curve illustrates an increasing 
relationship between the marginal productivity of labour and the cumulative output within a 
single firm in the production of a specific good. Alternatively, and more generally, it displays 
a decreasing relationship between input specific costs and the cumulative output.  
 
The learning effect was first formalized in the aeroplane industry, among others by Wright in 
his paper Factors affecting the cost of airplanes published in 1936 (IEA, 2000)). Wright 
observed a negative and decreasing relationship between the number of hours spent on 
producing one airframe and the quantity of airframes. He also discovered that the same 
mathematical expression for cost reductions could be applied on various inputs to the 
production process within a single firm or factory. The resulting graphs when plotting these 
expressions in log-log-diagrams became known as learning curves. 
 
A broader concept of learning curves, namely the notion of experience curves, was introduced 
by Boston Consulting Group in 1968 (IEA, 2000). Whereas learning curves display input 
specific costs per unit, experience curves on the other hand display total costs per unit. Hence, 
experience curves reflect productivity enhancements not just due to “learning-by-doing,” but 
also all other factors that can improve productivity, such as organizational development, 
improvements in production technology and management etc. If in addition intra-industrial 
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spillover effects are to be included in the analysis, then the unit cost within the industry will 
be the unit of measure instead of the unit cost within the firm. This entails that costs become 
difficult to observe and many experience curves therefore show the relationship between 
prices and cumulative production. The slopes of the price and the cost experience curves in a 
log-log diagram will nonetheless be the same in a stable market, i.e. they will display the 
same progress ratio (defined below) (IEA, 2000).  
 
There is according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “overwhelming empirical 
support for such a price experience relationship from all fields of industrial activities, 
including the production of equipment that transforms or uses energy” (IEA, 2000, p.11). 
However, in some special cases the experience effects are miniscule or even non-existent, as 
shown by Greaker and Sagen (2008) in a case study of liquefied natural gas.  
 
Following Bye at al. (2002), a common way to express experience curves formally is by the 
following relation: 
() =  ()  
where c(t) is the unit cost of a particular product at time t, C0 is the cost of the first unit and 
X(t) is the accumulated production at time t. E denotes the degree of learning. It is evident that 
1) the higher the degree of learning E, the larger the cost reduction when accumulated 
production increases, and 2) the learning effect is greatest in the initial phases of production 
after which it declines continuously. 
 
The experience curve can be illustrated as a linear graph in a diagram with a logarithmic scale 
by expressing the experience curve in logs: 
ln () = ln  −   ∗ ln () 
This logarithmic expression is convenient when comparing the experience curves of different 
technologies and when studying shifts in the graphs due to for example technological 
advances. A disadvantage is, however, that the decreasing effect of accumulated production 
on the unit costs is less obvious graphically. 
 
The slope of an experience curve is called the progress ratio (PR), and can be expressed in 
the following manner: 
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The progress ratio shows how much the unit costs would fall if the accumulated production 
were to be doubled. For instance, a PR of 0,7 means that the unit cost is 70 per cent of what it 
used to be before the accumulated production was doubled. Alternatively, unit costs are 
decreased by 30 per cent. This latter interpretation is the definition of a learning rate, and is 
defined as (1 - PR). 
 
Examples of experience curves are provided below. Figure 2.1 illustrates an experience curve 
for Danish wind turbines between 1982 and 1997. The progress ratio of 96 per cent implies 
that Danish onshore wind turbines are technologically mature since a doubling of the 
accumulated production reduces unit costs (measured in price (US$/kWh) per cumulative 
sales) with only 4 per cent. Figure 2.2 illustrates downward sloping experience curves 
(measured in costs of electricity (ECU/kWh) per cumulative electricity production) for 
different electric technologies in the European Union between 1980 and 1995 with progress 
ratios in parentheses. We see that the emerging renewable energy technologies wind, biomass 
electricity and photovoltaics experienced the greatest cost reductions in the period, and thus 
show the greatest potential for further experience effects. In contrast, the experience potential 
is almost exhausted regarding the more mature technologies of supercritical coal and NGCC 
(Natural Gas Combined Cycle). This latter figure demonstrates how the logarithmic 
expression for experience curves makes the different technologies easier to compare in terms 
of experience potential.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Danish wind turbines (1982 - 1997). Source: IEA (2000), p. 13. 
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Figure 2.2: Electric technologies in the EU (1980-1995). Source: IEA (2000), p. 21. 
 
There could be benefits in using learning curves instead of experience curves when studying 
new green technologies since it is natural to assume that different components have different 
learning rates depending on prior production. For example, the turbine of an offshore 
windmill will be technically mature because of onshore experience, while other components, 
such as the foundation, will be produced with fairly new technology. This would require 
decomposing the green technology in question and study the learning potential for each 
component separately.  
 
2.2 New green technologies and market failures 
Following NOU (2009:16), it is widely recognized that development of renewable energy 
technologies and cleaner production technologies are of the essence in the effort to reduce 
emissions of climate gasses. However, because there are two externalities in the market for 
new environmentally friendly technology, the optimal development of green technologies is 
not achieved in an unregulated market.  
 
The first externality is a negative environmental externality resulting from fossil fuel 
consumption and production. The environmental challenges are global challenges and market 
prices will not reflect this externality unless the environmental policies in all countries are 
designed to fully internalize it. Higher market prices through optimal taxation of emissions 
would generate increased demand for green technology alternatives since cost-minimizing 
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actors in the economy would want to avoid these additional externality costs. This again 
would spur innovation and development of new green technologies. However, as these 
externality costs are not fully internalized in the present context, prices on polluting 
consumption and production are lower then what they optimally should be, and thus, demand 
for green technology is not stimulated sufficiently. Consequently, the overall provision and 
employment of green technologies are too low compared to the socially optimal solution.  
 
Furthermore, the existence of learning effects in the production of new green technologies can 
under these circumstances cause technological lock-out (IEA, 2000): even though the new 
technology could prove to be competitive with traditional polluting technologies in the future, 
the sub-optimally low prices become a market barrier. Since the new green technologies are 
denied access to the market, they are at the same time denied the possibility to learn and of 
the subsequent reduction of unit costs that would have been necessary to be able to compete 
with the traditional technology. Thus, socially optimal technologies are locked out of the 
market. Based on estimates of damage costs resulting from combustion of fossil fuels, Owen 
(2006) demonstrates that a number of renewable energy technologies actually could be 
competitive if these costs were to be internalized into the price of electricity.  
 
The second externality is a positive externality, namely a spillover of learning. Spillover 
effects exist not only in green technology development, but in technology development in 
general. Knowledge is a non-rivalled and to some extent a non-excludable good with 
sometimes minimal transaction costs, and thus, once new knowledge and ideas have been 
developed it may be difficult to prevent dispersion to competing firms or to other industries or 
countries. Dispersion can occur for example because firms observe each other’s products or 
production methods, or because workers change their place of employment. Even if the new 
idea is granted patent protection, the protection will be time limited and it will nevertheless be 
possible for other firms to imitate to some extent. Although it is unrealistic to assume that 
spillover of learning is complete, several studies (see Roskow and Rose (1985) and 
Gustavsson et al., referred to in Bye et al. (2002)) imply that this spillover effect is important. 
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The existence of spillover effects curbs the development of new technology since it reduces 
the incentives to incur the necessary investment costs (NOU, 2009:16). Figure 2.3 illustrates 
the problem:  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Learning curve, learning investment and potential benefits in a firm. Source: NOU (2009:16), p.108. 
 
The decreasing curve in figure 2.3 is the learning curve in the production of a green 
technology in a single firm, displaying decreasing unit costs C as the quantity Q increases. Q* 
is the accumulated quantity at some future point in time. The technology becomes competitive 
in point D at the price P which denotes the price on the traditional polluting technology. 
Hence, the area A is the necessary learning investments and B is potential profit in the future. 
The relative sizes of A and B are determined by the progress ratio and by the price P. In order 
to be profitable for the firm to develop the new technology, B has to be larger than A. 
 
However, if there is a large degree of spillover of learning all the firms have an incentive to 
wait until other firms have made the entire learning investments and to enter the market when 
the technology has become competitive. Knowing this, no firm will be willing to incur the 
learning investment in the first place since the potential profit when the technology becomes 
competitive no longer is B, but zero. Specifically, the competing firms will enter at point D 
and the competition will result in the price being equal to costs from that point on, entailing 
that the price will follow the learning curve, and consequently, that B virtually disappears. As 
a result, the technology will never enter the market.  
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If, on the other hand, there is only a limited degree of spillover, then the investing firm can be 
able to establish some degree of market power, and thereby obtain B. The establishment of a 
monopoly (or oligopoly) will result in the technology being developed, but at the same time 
the provision of the new technology will be sub-optimally low in a monopolistic market.  
 
The existence of these externalities renders public regulation necessary. Thus, the discussion 
is not about whether public regulation is necessary, but about how to best achieve the desired 
technology development through policy measures. The IEA stresses that the experience curve 
methodology is an important tool in this assessment: 
 
(…) the experience curve methodology should be embedded in a continuous process of policy analysis 
and evaluation, where it will serve as an interactive tool for developing effective strategies to make 
environmentally friendly technologies available to the energy system. (IEA, 2000, p.18).  
 
More specifically, the IEA (2000) points out that experience curves can be used to measure 
the learning investments necessary for an emerging green technology to be competitive and to 
calculate and determine when this is going to happen. The methodology can also be applied to 
perform evaluation of policy measures both before and after implementation, in addition to 
monitoring during the process. It can also be used to evaluate and compare policy measures in 
different countries. 
 
2.3 About learning effects in cost-benefit analyses 
Learning effects are not mentioned explicitly in the guidelines for conducting CBAs by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2005), nor by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE) (2003). Learning effects, as all externalities, should be described and 
quantified based on direct and/or indirect methods in a CBA in principle. Public regulators are 
at the same time restrictive in including positive external effects. Benefits from an energy 
project which are not reflected in the market prices should according to the NVE (2003), 
which evaluates and gives licences to energy projects in Norway, be included in CBAs. The 
reasons for including such effects should, however, be well-founded as the NVE usually 
assumes that positive externalities are entirely included in the consumer surplus. 
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2.4 A critical perspective on learning curves 
The application of and comparison between learning curves are not straight forward. 
Nordhaus (2008) identifies three main difficulties with the use learning curves. First of all, 
there is a problem in separating learning effects from other effects which may also reduce unit 
costs as quantity increases. These include economies of scale, R&D, exogenous fundamental 
inventions and spillover effects from outside the industry. Additionally, as shown by Greaker 
and Sagen (2008), increased competition can also have this effect when experience curves are 
studied and price is the unit of measure, as the markets for new technology rarely are perfectly 
competitive . The learning rates will generally be biased upwards when these effects are not 
controlled for. This identification problem is also discussed by Bye et al. (2002), where it is 
noted that several of the additional effects would have been weaker if learning was not a 
significant factor.  
 
Second, estimates of total marginal costs of output will be incorrect when estimates are based 
on biased learning estimates. Hence, when learning curves are employed as a tool in energy 
and global warming models to select among different new technologies, technologies with 
low learning rates may be wrongly estimated to have high learning rates. Finally, Nordhaus in 
addition to Söderholm and Sundquist (2007) show that learning estimates are not robust to 
alternative model specifications, even when the same data set is applied. For instance, by 
employing panel data for wind power installation in four European countries and twelve 
different model specifications, Söderholm and Sundquist find that estimates of “learning-by-
doing” rates ranges between 0 and 8%. 
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3 A theoretical model of learning 
Presented below is a simple model of learning. The intention here is to derive some insights 
that can be employed when learning is to be included in the cost- benefit analysis in chapter 4. 
The model is based on optimal control theory and includes the positive learning externality 
and the negative environmental externality discussed in the previous chapter. Since 
externality effects are not limited to the economy they originate in, the following model 
should be regarded as a global model.  
 
First, the social planner’s solution and the market solution are derived and these will be 
compared subsequently. Then regulation is explored in different scenarios, including the 
possibility of technological lock-out. Thereafter follows a discussion of whether all 
technological development or just green technological development should be subsidized. 
Underlying the model is a number of simplifying assumptions which will be elaborated on at 
the end of this chapter.  
 
3.1 The model 
We assume that there exist two sources of energy in the economy; renewable energy x(t) and 
energy from coal combustion z(t). These types of energy will be referred to as “green” and 
“brown” energy respectively. The renewable energy is produced in a perfectly competitive 
industry with total production costs in period t given by 
(1) () =  () #()$% =  ()  #()
$
%   
where x(t) is the instantaneous production of the renewable energy and c(t) is a cost parameter 
for the industry. By applying a value of θ strictly larger than one we are assuming decreasing 
returns to scale in the production of green energy. This is because it is reasonable to expect 
that the production level of new facilities producing renewable energy such as wind and hydro 
power will depend on location and that the industry will develop the best locations first. 
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By replacing the unit costs c(t) with the formal expression for a learning curve presented in 
chapter 2, we get the last equality in equation (1). As before, E denotes the degree of learning 
and X(t) is the accumulated production of the renewable energy in the industry as a whole. C0 
is total initial costs which are assumed to include investment costs in addition to costs related 
to the production of the green energy for all subsequent periods.  
 
The first and second order derivatives, &'()&(()  < 0  and &
+'()
&(()&(()  > 0 , reflect that learning in 
the production process reduces the unit costs and that the effect is decreasing. Furthermore, 
we assume that the growth rate of X(t) over time,  -(()- =  . , is the instantaneous output rate 
x(t) and that no prior learning effects exist before the first period, so that X(0) = 0. Naturally, 
X(t) is always non-negative. Since increasing the production of x(t) in any firm reduces the 
unit costs for the entire industry, i.e. all the firms face the same unit costs in every period t, 
the spillover effect of learning is assumed to be complete in this model.  
 
Hence, by applying the cost function above we are assuming that learning is generated in the 
production of energy. On the one hand, technological learning is in large part produced in the 
production of the green energy technology itself, and not in the production of energy 
generated from that technology. Thus, a more appropriate cost function would be a cost 
function for the development of green technology. In other words, it would be more 
appropriate to study, for example, the market for windmills and not the market for electricity 
generated from wind power if what we want to study is technological learning.  
 
On the other hand, the current formulation of the cost function is an approximation which 
allows us to study the market for electricity and the dynamics between the green and the 
brown energy, which is a key aspect in this context. We will assume that learning incurs both 
in the investment in green technologies and in the actual production of electricity. The latter is 
assumed to be generated by learning-by-doing in the operation and maintenance of the green 
energy facilities and in technological improvements in smaller components which can replace 
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older components. The learning produced in the investment is assumed to spill over gradually 
over time as production of green energy proceeds. 
 
A similar approximation has been employed by Rosendahl (2004) in a study of abatement 
technologies, where the process of abatement gives experience with clean technologies, 
leading to increased productivity and lower costs. Rasmussen (2001) employs a model which 
includes learning in the production of capital goods used to produce renewable energy, but 
this approach is not directly applicable because the model is a numerical model.  
 
Energy from coal combustion is assumed to be produced by a mature technology with a 
constant marginal production cost /. There are constant returns to scale in this industry given 
that the production is not as dependent on location as production of the renewable energy. 
Production of this type of energy entails emissions ε(t) where one unit of brown energy 
releases one unit of emissions, i.e. z(t) = ε(t). We will assume, in conformity with Hoel 
(2011), that the emissions cause stock-damage pollution with constant marginal damages per 
unit equal to 0 > 0. Furthermore, we assume that energy from the combustion of coal, just like 
the renewable energy, is available in unlimited amounts. Arguments for this assumption are 
provided at the end of this chapter. Thus, with regard to the brown energy, the optimization 
problem is not dynamic.  
 
The total and marginal benefits of energy to society are given by 
(2) () =  12() −  3 (2())3 
(3)  -4()-5() = 1 − 2() 
respectively, where b is the choke price, defined as the maximum price the society is willing 
to pay for energy in the form of electricity. For prices higher than b, the society switches 
consumption to other forms of energy. y(t) is the total supply of energy and we assume that 
the renewable energy and the energy from coal combustion are perfect substitutes, so that 
(4)  2() = 6() +  8() (the energy balance) 
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3.2 The first best solution 
The social planner maximizes the net benefits of energy production in present value terms 
over all periods, where t ϵ (0, ∞). The problem can be formulated as:  
max < =1 6() +  8()" −  12  6() +  8()"3 − ()
6()%
? −  /8() −  08()@ A B
∞

 
with respect to the control variables x(t) and z(t), given,  . () =  6(), (0) =  0 and 
() ≥ 0 for all t. 
 
The current value Hamiltonian is  
D =  1 6() +  8()" −  12  6() +  8()"3 −  ()
6()%
? −  /8() −  08() +  E()6() 
 
The maximum principle when assuming an internal solution gives the following optimality 
conditions: 
 (5) &F&#() = 0  ⟹  1 − 2()  =  ()6()% −  E() 
 (6) &F&H() = 0  ⟹  1 − 2()  =  / + 0  
 (7) E.() =  IE() −  &F&(()  =  IE() −  ()() #()
$
%  
(8) lim→∞ ()E()A = 0 
 
Thus, the optimal solution for every period t requires the following: Regarding the production 
of the renewable energy (equation (5)), the marginal benefits of energy have to be equal to 
marginal production costs minus the value of learning, λ(t). That is, λ(t) is the shadow price 
on the accumulated production and it is assumed to be non-negative. More specifically, λ(t) 
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reflects the increased value of the objective function (the Hamiltonian), that is, the increased 
current value welfare in period t, when the we relax the constraint and the accumulated 
production X(t) increases marginally. This follows from the envelope theorem. The optimal 
value of learning can be expressed explicitly as the difference between the green and the 
brown marginal costs at the optimal production levels when equation (5) is rearranged and 
inserted for equation (6):  
(9) E() = ()6()% − (/ + 0)  
However, solving this expression requires that we know the optimal production level of the 
green energy x(t), which again depends on the value of learning. 
 
As for the energy from coal combustion (equation (6)), the optimal production level is 
determined by the marginal benefits of energy being equal to total marginal costs, consisting 
of the marginal production costs / and the marginal damage costs 0. As explained below, this 
equation does not always hold since the brown energy eventually is phased out in this model. 
It is generally assumed to hold in the following, and it will be specified when not. 
 
Equation (7) is a differential equation showing the period specific growth rate of the value of 
learning E.(), where E. =  &L& .  The growth rate is determined by the social discount rate I ≥ 0 
and the value of learning λ(t), in addition to the marginal cost of increasing the accumulated 
production, i.e. learning, and the instantaneous production level 6(). This equation will be 
elaborated on shortly. 
 
The last condition is the transversality condition implying that the value of learning converges 
to zero when time goes to infinity and accumulated production becomes very large.  
 
We deduce the optimal production level of the renewable energy x(t)* directly from equation 
(5) and substitute the marginal benefit 1 − 2() with equation (6). The optimal production 
level of energy from coal combustion z(t)* is found by inserting for the optimal level of x(t) 
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and the optimal level of y(t) given by (6) into the energy balance (equation (4)), and then 
solving for z(t):  
 (10) 6()∗  = NO5() L()PQ(()RS T
U
$RU =  N'/V L()PQ(()RS T
U
$RU
  
 (11) 8()∗ =  2()∗ −  6()∗ =  1 −  / −  0 − N'/V L()PQ(()RS T
U
$RU  
 
It is evident from these expressions that the higher the value of learning λ(t) the higher the 
production of the green energy, and consequently, the lower the production of the brown. 
Moreover, a higher degree of learning E has a stronger positive effect on the production of the 
renewable energy compared to a lower one. Given that production of the green energy is 
positive in all periods, the denominator is increasing continuously since the accumulated 
production of the green energy X(t) is growing with a positive rate, which implies that the 
production of the green energy is increasing over time at the cost of the brown energy. An 
increase of the choke price b increases only the production of the brown energy. A higher 
value of the marginal damage 0 increases the supply of the green energy and reduces the 
supply of the brown energy both directly and indirectly through the increase of x(t). Naturally, 
increased production costs of one of the energy types will decrease production of the energy 
type in question and increase the other. The production level of x(t) increases more rapidly the 
closer the value of θ is to one.  
 
A more precise expression for the growth rate of the value of learning E.() can be found by 
inserting the expression for the period specific value of learning (equation (9)) into the 
differential equation (7)2:  
 E.() = IW()6()% − (/ + 0) X − ()() #()$%   
Or equivalently, 
                                                 
2
 Instead of inserting for λ(t) in the differential equation (7), one could alternatively insert for x(t)* from equation 
(9). However, one would get an expression with λ(t) raised to the power of θ and thus get an equation resembling 
a Riccati equation, which generally is not possible to solve analytically. Inserting for λ(t) also results in an 
expression that has to be solved numerically, but it is simpler than the Riccati equation. 
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(12) E.() = I()6()% − ()() #()$% − I(/ + 0)  
Equation (12) shows that the components affecting the growth rate of the value of learning are 
the marginal costs and the discount rate. Specifically, E . depends on 1) the net marginal cost in 
the green energy industry (defined as the difference between marginal cost of production 
(times the discount rate) and the marginal benefits of producing “learning”) and 2) the total 
marginal cost of producing the brown energy times the discount rate. Hence, the growth rate 
of the value of learning is negative whenever the benefits from learning outweigh the 
marginal green production costs. Furthermore, it is negative whenever the net marginal costs 
is smaller than the total marginal cost of producing the brown energy for a given discount 
rate, and positive otherwise. Equation (12) cannot be integrated to obtain an analytical 
solution for λ(t) because we do not have any explicit expressions for the variables x(t) and 
X(t).  
 
It is not straightforward to determine the sign of this growth rate, even if equation (12) is 
factorized. Studying the equation, we see that the first term will decrease over time and 
approach the constant last term since accumulated production is always increasing, thereby 
reducing unit costs because of learning. When the costs have fallen to the point where 
equality is obtained between these two terms, the only term left is the second term, which is 
negative. Hence we know that the growth rate will become negative eventually, but we cannot 
say for certain that it is negative in every period t. As a special case, setting the value of the 
convexity parameter θ equal to 1, we see from equation (9) that the value of learning will 
decrease over time given the decreasing green marginal costs.  
  
3.3 The market solution 
We apply the same assumptions as before. Furthermore, we presume that both industries 
consider profit maximizing to be a static problem. Specifically, we continue to assume that 
both coal and the renewable energy are available in unlimited amounts. In addition, we 
assume that neither of the industries includes the externalities they are producing in their 
optimization problems:  
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The coal burning industry disregards the damages from emissions because they are not 
required to and minimize costs by not. The firms in the renewable energy industry disregard 
the learning effects because 1) they do not themselves benefit in period t from their own 
generation of learning in period t, and 2) even though they reduce the production costs of 
other firms in the industry through the spillover of learning, they are not compensated for this 
effect. Consequently, private production costs are higher than the social production costs of 
the green energy. X(t) is considered by the industry to be an exogenous variable. Thus, given 
these assumptions, other periods than the period in question are irrelevant when the industries 
profit maximize. 
 
In a competitive market the demand for energy, given by the market price p(t), will be equal 
to the marginal benefit of energy: 
 (13) Y() =  1 − 2() 
If energy production from coal combustion is profitable in period t, i.e. that marginal costs are 
lower than or equal to the market price (/ ≤ Y() ), the profit maximizing coal burning 
industry will increase production until equality is obtained: 
  (14) Y() =  / 
Hence, by combing the two latter conditions one can deduce the total amount of energy 
supplied when the production of both types of energy is positive: 
 (15) 2() =  1 −  / 
 
The competitive industry for renewable energy will in every period have the following profit 
maximizing problem: 
 Π = max =Y()6() −  ()  6()
%
? @ 
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The derivate with respect to x(t) provides the standard profit maximizing condition that 
marginal costs should equal the market price:  
BΠ
B6() ⟹  Y() =  ()6()% 
 
The amount of renewable energy that will be produced in an unregulated market is found by 
solving for x(t) directly: 
(16) 6() = N [()PQ(()RST
U
$RU =  N '/PQ(()RST
U
$RU
 
where equation (14) is applied in the last equality. The supply of energy from coal 
combustion is derived by inserting the market solution for x(t) in (16) and y(t) in (15) into the 
energy balance:  
(17) 8() =  1 −  / − N '/PQ(()RST
U
$RU
 
 
Hence, the brown energy will not be produced if  1 −  / <  N '/PQ(()RST
U
$RU
, which would entail 
that Y() <  /. This latter inequality is found by using that 8() =  0 → 2() = 6() =
 N '/PQ(()RST
U
$RU  and equation (13). The market supply of the green energy would in this case 
fulfil 6() = N O#()PQ(()RST
U
$RU
, which is derived by inserting for / = 1 − 2() = 1 − 6() from 
equation (15) into the expression for the market provision of x(t) (equation 16). 
 
The equivalent solution in the first best case can be deduced in a similar manner. Rewriting 
equation (9) as an inequality, the brown energy will not be produced if 1 − / − 0 <
N'/V L()PQ(()RS T
U
$RU
, which would entail that Y() <  / + 0. The socially optimal level of x(t) would 
then fulfil 6() =  NO#() L()PQ(()RS T
U
$RU
, derived by the same logic.  
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3.4 Comparing the outcomes 
For the sake of comparison the social planner’s solutions and the market solutions are 
summarized in table 3.1.  
 
 
Production level of  x(t) when 
z(t) > 0 
Production level of z(t) when profitable 
First best solution 
6() = =\ + 0 + E()0()− @
1?−1
 8() = 1 − \ − 0 − =\ + 0 +  E()0()− @
1?−1
 
when Y() =  \ +  0 
Market solution  
6() = = \0()−@
1?−1
 8() = 1 − \ − = \0()−@
1?−1
 
when Y() =  \ 
Table 3.1: First and second best solutions. 
 
It is evident that the first best solution is not realized in the unregulated market, the reason 
being that neither of the industries includes the externalities in the profit maximizing problem. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the problem where both types of energy are produced:  
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of first and second best solutions in period t. 
 
The figure illustrates a (y(t), p(t))-diagram with a downward sloping marginal benefit curve 
starting in the choke price b, the green energy industry’s upward sloping marginal cost curve 
and the brown energy industry’s constant marginal cost curve. The dotted curves represent the 
first best solution, while the solid-drawn curves represent the unregulated market solution. 
The socially optimal values of the variables are denoted with (*) and values from the market 
solution are denoted with (m). The first best and second best values of z(t) are implicitly given 
by 8	 =  2	 −  6	   (] = ∗, ^).  
 
The first best solution (6∗, 2∗) is not implemented in the unregulated market because marginal 
costs of producing the brown energy, /, is sub-optimally low, giving a sub-optimally low 
market price on energy at Y_. The marginal costs of producing the brown energy constitute a 
second choke price, namely the choke price for the renewable energy since consumption 
switches to the brown energy at prices above Y_. In addition, private marginal costs of 
producing the green energy are higher than the social marginal costs because of the value of 
learning λ(t). Consequently, the market solution results in a too low production of the 
renewable energy at 6_ < 6∗ and a too high overall supply of energy at  2_  >  2∗ since 
prices are unaffected. Hence, the production of the polluting energy is also too high.  
 
A 
()6% −  E 
()6% 
/ +  0  
/ 
1 − 2  
2 
Y 
1 
Y_ 
6∗ 2_ 2∗ 6_ 
Y∗ 
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3.5 Regulation  
3.5.1 Optimal tax and subsidy 
The first best solution (6∗, 2∗)  in any period t can be obtained by introducing a tax τ equal to 
the marginal damages 0 inflicted by the brown energy production, and a learning subsidy `() 
on the production of the green energy equal to the size of λ(t) at the x(t)* production level.  
 
It is possible to say something about the development over time after the implementation of 
the regulation by studying figure 3.1. These assessments are also verified by the numerical 
calibration in section 3.7. Introducing the tax τ and the subsidy `() will initially increase the 
market price on energy from Y_ to Y∗ and decrease the marginal costs of the renewable 
energy production. This increases the production of the green energy to the optimal  6∗ level 
and the overall supply of energy is reduced to the 2∗ level. Hence, the production of the 
brown energy is also reduced. As the subsequent periods incur, marginal costs of the green 
energy is gradually reduced due to learning and the production of this type of energy 
increases. Thus, learning causes the marginal cost curve to gradually rotate downwards. This 
has three implications:  
 
First, the value of learning and the corresponding learning subsidy is not constant over time, 
in contrast to the tax τ on the brown energy which should be constant for all periods given 
constant marginal damages. Second, energy from coal combustion is eventually phased out in 
this model since we have assumed that the learning effect always is positive, going 
asymptotically towards zero in the limit. Hence, the brown energy will be phased out of the 
market when the green marginal cost curve has surpassed point A in the figure. Finally, the 
new market price Y∗ and the new total energy supply level 2∗ remain constant after the 
regulation until the brown energy is phased out. Beyond point A, the market price becomes 
solely determined by demand and supply of the green energy and thus, with continuously 
falling marginal costs, the market price decreases and the supply increases.  
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These dynamics and the phasing out of the brown energy will incur even without regulation 
given the model specification above where the possibility of technological lock-out does not 
exist. The reason is that learning in period t is included in the renewable energy industry’s 
profit maximization problem, but with a time lag of one period through the decrease of unit 
costs  (). That is, the marginal cost curve will gradually rotate downwards, but since 
the generation of learning in period t is not included in the period t optimization, the private 
marginal costs are too high and the production of green energy too low in all periods 
compared to the first best solution. Coal will eventually be phased out, but at a later point in 
time than what is socially optimal. 
 
3.5.2 A sub-optimal tax 
As discussed in chapter 2, one of the primary obstacles to the expansion of renewable energy 
technology is the sub-optimal environmental policies which cause too low market prices 
which do not stimulate demand for green technologies sufficiently. An interesting question is 
whether it is optimal to introduce a subsidy on learning larger than λ(t) to compensate for a 
too low tax. This scenario can be illustrated by slightly modifying figure 3.1 above. 
  
 
Figure 3.2: Overcompensating subsidy. 
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()6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_
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Figure 3.2 is identical to figure 3.1 with the addition of a new “green” marginal cost curve, 
drawn with a dotted line. It displays where the curve would have to be to obtain the optimal 
level of the renewable energy 6∗, i.e. where it would be if the absent tax on the brown energy 
τ instead were given as a subsidy to the green energy in period t. The discussed scenario will 
be the corner solution where there is no tax on emissions. The effects caused by a sub-
optimally low tax are equivalent, although somewhat weaker.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows that if only the optimal subsidy `() is implemented, but the tax is not, that 
the production of the renewable energy at 6bwould be larger than without the subsidy at 6_, 
but still too low compared to the first best solution 6∗. The expansion of the green energy 
production suppresses some of the production of the brown energy, but not enough to obtain 
the optimal level 8∗. The overall production of energy would be too high at 2_ >  2∗.  
 
If instead an overcompensating subsidy equal to the sum of the optimal subsidy `() at 6∗ and 
the size of the tax τ were granted the renewable energy industry, like the newly introduced 
graph illustrates, the first best level of the green energy 6∗ would be obtained. However, as 
the market price Y_ is unaffected by the subsidy as long as the curve is above point A, the 
production of the energy from coal combustion and the total supply of energy 2_ would still 
be too high compared to the first best solution. Thus, the optimal values 6∗ and 8∗ cannot be 
obtained simultaneously by introducing an overcompensating subsidy to correct for a too low 
tax. However, the optimal level of just 6∗ is attainable, and there could be arguments for 
introducing the overcompensating subsidy to achieve this level. This is because the subsidy 
both optimally adjusts for the value of learning and, through the increase of 6, suppresses 
some of the brown energy, thereby reducing damages from emissions. This will be elaborated 
on in section 3.6. 
 
3.5.3 The case of technological lock-out  
A related situation described in chapter 2 was the possibility of technological lock-out due to 
imperfect taxes and thus, too low market prices. In order to study a situation of lock-out the 
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model has to be altered by introducing constant production costs ̂ in the cost function for the 
renewable energy industry, given by 
(18) () =  ̂6()  +  () #()$%  
 
Using exactly the same approach as above only now with the new cost function, the first best 
solutions for the renewable energy and the energy from coal combustion becomes  
(19) 6()∗  =  N'/VL() '̂PQ(()RS T
U
$RU
  (20) 8()∗ = 1 −  / −  0 − N'/VL() '̂PQ(()RS T
U
$RU  
Similarly, the provision of the two energy types from the optimization in the market is    
(21) 6() =  N [() '̂PQ(()RST
U
$RU =  N '/ '̂PQ(()RST
U
$RU
   (22) 8() =  1 −  / −  N '/ '̂PQ(()RST
U
$RU
 
The expressions are exactly as before, only now with the additional cost term ̂. 
 
The possibility of technological lock-out in period t is illustrated in figure 3.3: 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Possibility of technological lock-out. 
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As before, the dotted curves represent the first best solution, while the solid-drawn curves 
represent the unregulated market solution. The socially optimal values of the variables are 
denoted with (*) and values from the market solution are denoted with (m).  
 
Figure 3.3 shows the case in which the constant cost of producing the renewable energy  dis 
above the market price Y_ when the optimal tax τ has not been implemented. Given these 
circumstances, the renewable energy will never enter the market because the marginal costs 
will never be below the market price, irrespective of the learning potential and the size of the 
learning subsidy `(). However, the introduction of an optimal tax τ in period t, or even a 
sub-optimally low tax which is sufficiently high, renders the industry competitive. The 
dynamics will be the same as before, with the brown energy eventually being phased out of 
the market. On the other hand, if ̂ is higher than the market price Y∗ even after the 
introduction of an optimal tax, lock-out is the most economically efficient solution in period t.  
 
3.6 Green technologies vs. other innovations 
Spillover of learning is not restricted to green energy technology industries. It is a general 
effect generated by all knowledge accumulation, including the development of for example 
flat screen TVs, mobile phones, digital cameras and other innovations. The question is then 
whether all production of learning should be compensated, and if not, why.  
 
It could be argued that, besides the practical difficulties with rewarding every new idea, a 
reasonable assumption would be that all firms in both green and non-green industries produce 
at least some learning, which implies that everybody at the same time is getting some learning 
for free: they are not compensated for their production of learning, but they are at the same 
time reaping the benefits of learning in other firms, without compensating them. In this sense, 
the spillover effects are to some extent evened out. In this perspective, learning should not be 
compensated, irrespective of industry.  
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However, the difference between the consumer goods mentioned above and green energy, 
namely the environmental externality generated in the production of the brown substitute, 
could be argued to provide different policy rationales: 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Subsidizing green energy technology 
 
Figure 3.4 is identical to figure 3.1, but the different production levels of the green energy xt 
when there is no regulation (6), just subsidies (6e), just taxes (6f) and optimal regulation 
(6∗) are emphasized in this figure. As before, the production of the brown energy is implicitly 
given by 8	 =  2	 − 6	   (] =  0, g, a,∗). As discussed above, whenever the production of the 
green energy is lower than the optimal level 6∗, the production level of the brown energy and 
emissions are overly high.  
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates that this is the case both when the taxation is sub-optimal (or non-
existent as demonstrated by the corner solution in this case), giving production levels of the 
brown energy equal to 8 hI 8e, where 8  >  8e > 8∗ and when the taxation is optimal, 
giving  8f > 8∗. Given that there is a welfare loss in the economy whenever the production of 
the green energy deviates from the optimal level, this implies that if the optimal level for 
some reason is unattainable the economy should aim to be as close to the optimal level as 
possible.  
 
This line of reasoning suggests that green energy technology should be compensated for the 
production of learning because the increased green production suppresses brown energy and 
6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hence pollution, thereby increasing welfare. This also suggests that an overcompensating 
subsidy is welfare enhancing, as noted above. Given that learning subsidies should be granted 
to green industries and not to other industries due to the negative externality from brown 
substitutes, another implication is that government support should cease once the brown 
energy has been phased out of the market. However, it could be argued that the green energy 
industries should be subsidized in some additional periods after which the brown energy has 
been phased out to prevent that this type of energy suddenly becomes profitable again. 
 
3.7 Discussion  
The model presented in this chapter is based on several simplifying assumptions which will 
be elaborated on in this section. First, it is assumed that coal exists in unlimited amounts and 
that the Hotelling rule3 is disregarded in both the first best solution and in the market solution. 
According to estimates referred to by the World Coal Association (accessed 14/2-2012) there 
exist over 847 billion tonnes of proven coal reserves worldwide. This entails that with current 
rates of production there exists enough coal to last for another 118 years. In contrast, proven 
oil and gas reserves are estimated to last for about 46 and 59 years respectively at current 
production levels.  
 
Proved reserves is defined by the World Coal Association as reserves that are recoverable 
economically, while resources is defined as total amounts of coal that may exist, independent 
of whether the technology to extract them exists and the profitability of extraction. Thus, coal 
has the potential to last even longer with further technological developments and resource 
discoveries for unchanged production rates. Whether or not coal exists in unlimited amounts 
does in any case not alter the fundamental problem of the negative externality not being 
internalized in the market prices. Hence, the market price on energy will irrespectively not be 
optimal in any period as long as the production of energy from coal combustion is positive.   
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the renewable energy industry does not take into account the 
learning effects they are generating. However, the existence of a learning curve in the 
production process can make the short-run output decision a strategic tool when the spillover 
                                                 
3
 The Hotelling rule is an intertemporal optimality condition for extraction of non-renewable resources, stating 
that the value of the resource is maximized when the resource rent rises with the social discount rate.  
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effect is not complete, as studied by Spence (1981). Spence compares the output decision with 
an investment decision which affects future costs and market position. Since a higher short-
run output level results in a higher degree of learning and cost reductions, the optimality 
condition for every period t becomes that marginal short-run profits should equal the present 
value of the total cost reduction over all subsequent periods of an additional unit of output in 
period t. In other words, short-run marginal profits should be negative, and thus, the existence 
of a learning curve can create a market barrier for other firms. According to a report by 
Douglas-Westwood (2011), this strategy was pursued by some contractors in the early stages 
of offshore wind power development. 
 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) argue that learning can encourage the growth of industrial 
concentration when the spillover of learning is incomplete. When spillover effects exist, 
Spence finds that the larger the learning effects, the less aggressive the firms are in their 
decision of the first-period output. Moreover, the spillover effects result in increased 
competition and improved market performance. In the model above, firms in the green energy 
industry is not in a position to take any strategic advantage of the learning effects, given the 
assumption of perfect spillover effects of learning and given that the green and brown types of 
energy are perfect substitutes. 
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4 Cost-benefit analysis of Havsul I 
 
Presented below is a simplified cost- benefit analysis of the Norwegian offshore wind power 
project Havsul I. By applying the results from the theoretical model in the previous chapter it 
will be demonstrated how learning can be included in such an analysis. The analysis will be 
based on the general presentation of CBAs in chapter 1, in addition to the Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate’s (NVE) (2008) report on the directory’s grounds for 
granting the Havsul project a licence. This last-mentioned report is not a CBA, but it 
identifies all relevant aspects of executing the project and potentially affected parties, which 
basically is the first part of a CBA. It also contains assumptions about the developers’ costs 
and a discount rate which will be employed in the quantifying part of the analysis.  
 
First, since learning effects are important in this analysis, some general facts about offshore 
wind power development and the potential for technological learning are presented. External 
conditions are described in the introduction to this thesis and will not be repeated in the 
analysis below. Then the Havsul project will be described, including the base alternative and 
affected parties. Thereafter, the costs and benefits of the project will be quantified by using 
the learning model in chapter 3.  
 
4.1 Mapping out the relevant aspects  
4.1.1 Offshore wind power development 
Offshore wind power is currently an emerging and immature technology. The first offshore 
wind farm was installed in Denmark in 1991 and consisted of eleven 450 kW turbines with a 
total capacity of 5 MW. However, the first “utility-scale” offshore wind farm was not 
installed until 10 years later. Today, 53 wind farms consisting of 1 371 turbines with a total 
capacity of 3 813 MW are installed and grid-connected in ten European countries according to 
the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) (2012). No offshore wind farms have been 
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installed in Norwegian waters to date. As of December 2011, offshore wind power generates 
14 TWh4 in a normal wind year, covering 0,4 % of the total energy consumption in the EU.  
 
Offshore wind power development is primarily a European undertaking, the UK and Denmark 
being the leading actors. However, China and the US are expected to become important 
markets in the future. EWEA (2011) estimates that by 2030 the total installed capacity in 
Europe will become approximately 40 times larger and reach 150 000 MW, generating a total 
of 562 TWh electricity production. Offshore wind power will by then be covering 14 % of the 
electricity demand in the EU.  
 
Offshore wind power has compelling advantages compared to the onshore alternative. 
According to NORWEA (2012a), the offshore location entails better and more stabile wind 
resources and vast available areas. In addition, the conflict of interest regarding the windmills 
location is likely to be smaller when these are situated offshore, thus reducing the visual and 
audible impacts.  
 
The main obstacle with current offshore wind power development is the costs. Windmills are 
generally capital-intensive and require large investment costs, and offshore windmills are 
more expensive than onshore windmills because of larger structures and more immature 
components. In addition, the offshore location enhances both the costs of installing the 
windmills on site and the operation and maintenance costs.  
 
The cost development in the wind power industry in general followed the estimated learning 
curve until 2004, displaying a learning rate of approximately 10 % per MW installed. 
Between 2004 and 2006 this decreasing cost trend changed and the price on wind power 
increased by 20-25%. This was due to elevated costs of raw materials, especially of steel, in 
addition to increased demand for wind power which created a scarcity in wind power 
manufacturing capacity (EWEA, 2009).  
                                                 
4
 1TWh = 1 billion kWh. 
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There is according to a report on offshore wind power development by Douglas-Westwood 
(2010) learning potential both in the components of an offshore windmill and in the actual 
production of electricity. Estimates calculated by using the learning rate methodology and 
information gathered from the offshore wind power industry imply that the costs of the 
various components and costs related to operation and maintenance will be reduced by 20-
40% by 2030. These learning effects will largely reflect the use of lighter and stronger 
materials, design improvements regarding the turbine and improved efficiency in production 
process regarding the foundations. Operation and maintenance costs are expected to decrease 
due to improvements in management and condition monitoring systems and to reduced costs 
in replacement equipment. The report also concludes that offshore wind power may become 
competitive with onshore wind power by 2030 under certain circumstances.  
 
4.1.2 Description of the Havsul project and the base alternative 
In a Norwegian context the Havsul project is ground-breaking because it is the only full-scale 
offshore wind farm that has been granted a licence by the NVE as yet. The licence for 
installation and operation was granted in 2008, but no windmills have been installed by the 
developer Vestavind Offshore so far. Situated just outside of Sandøy in the county of Møre og 
Romsdal, Havsul will according to the developer consist of about 70 wind turbines each with 
a 5MW capacity. Thus, the farm will have a total capacity of 350MW and generate 
approximately 1 TWh annually, enough to cover the electricity consumption of about 50 000 
households. Current estimates of total investment costs lie in the range of 6 – 7 billion NOK 
(Vestavind Offshore, 2012).  
 
The Havsul project is a quite modern project by European standards with respect to choice of 
components and installation methods. The choice of gravity-base (concrete) foundation, 
turbines with a capacity of 5MW and a blade diameter of 120 meters follows the trend within 
the industry away from the traditional monopole foundation, in addition to the application of 
larger blades and increased turbine capacity. Moreover, the developer aspires to complete the 
assembly of the entire windmill in one operation in calm waters close to shore and transport it 
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to the final location. This is according to NORWEA (2012b) the main innovative contribution 
of the Havsul project, since the windmills normally are assembled on site, requiring 5-6 
operations.  
 
The NVE (2008) granted the Havsul project a licence for two reasons. First of all, there is a 
significant undersupply of electricity in the relevant area which is reflected in the regional 
electricity prices. Energy-intensive industries (e.g. Hydro aluminium and Ormen Lange) 
located here contribute to this electrical power deficit. The electricity supply from Havsul will 
therefore improve the electric power balance in the region considerably, especially because 
the supply will be largest during the winter when the power situation is particularly strained. 
Second, development of offshore wind power, and renewable energy in general, is in line with 
the Norwegian government’s objectives regarding climate policy.  
 
Two main negative consequences of the project are emphasized in the NVE report, namely 
the visual impacts and the possible impacts on birds living in the area. The smallest distance 
to a populated area is about 5km and the farm will be visually dominating. The windmills will 
constitute a technical interference in the natural surroundings, and thus, will alter the character 
and the experience of the scenery substantially. This may have adverse effects on outdoor life, 
the tourist industry and the experience of cultural monuments in the area. The NVE deems the 
project to have medium or large effects on the landscape depending on the final layout of the 
farm. It is also noted that the perception of windmills may differ between individuals, and that 
they for some may be perceived as a symbol of progress and activity in the region or they may 
be regarded as positive elements because of green energy-preferences.  
 
The possible negative impacts on birds are related to local bird reservations and migration 
concerning the possibility of collisions with the turbines, adverse effects on important 
biotopes and disturbance, especially in the construction period. The hazard of birds colliding 
with the windmills is particularly relevant regarding migrating birds: The migration of birds 
along the coastline of Møre og Romsdal is extensive and the route is assumed to have 
international value. However, there are large uncertainties regarding the magnitude of the 
39 
 
impacts on birds. Studies from other countries indicate that birds can detect the turbines at a 
large distance and are able to re-route to avoid the farms. Other studies indicate that some bird 
species return to the bird sanctuaries after the construction period, while others do not.   
 
The NVE concludes in its report that the benefits from Havsul outweigh the costs in socio-
economic terms, while government subsidies would be required in order for the project to be 
profitable for the developers5.  
 
The scenario where Havsul is not developed is selected as the base alternative in this CBA. 
By adopting this base alternative, it is implicitly assumed that the location cannot be 
developed for other purposes or for other similar projects that would have increased welfare. 
Thus, costs and benefits of the Havsul project are compared to the situation where nothing is 
changed in the relevant area. Assuming that neither costs nor benefits change in this case, all 
quantified costs and benefits will be compared to zero.  
 
4.1.3 Affected parties  
The NVE’s report on the grounds for granting a licence to the Havsul project contains 
detailed descriptions about the consequences for different industries in the region in addition 
to submissions from private associations. According to the report, the execution of the Havsul 
project is likely to have negative effects on the fishery and tourist industry and local residents. 
The last-mentioned group will notice the windmills visually, but due to the distance from 
shore, the farm will only barely be noticeable audibly.   
 
The risk that certain shallow water fishing equipment may cause damage to the windfarm’s 
submarine cable stands out as the largest negative effect on the fishing industry. Because the 
windmills will be situated in shallow waters, larger fishing boats will not be affected, as is 
also the case for the navigation industry in general. The fish stock is likely to be scared off 
                                                 
5
 This conclusion is apparently not based on a CBA with quantified effects. It may be that the NVE has executed 
a CBA of Havsul, but this has to our knowledge not been made publicly available. 
40 
 
during the construction period, but a specialist report predicts that these will return after this 
period. 
 
The tourist industry in the region is not very large, but the actors operating in this area found 
their business on the natural surroundings. This includes the view of the coastal scenery in 
general, in addition to sea fishing, scuba diving and boat hire services. The largest negative 
effect regarding the tourist industry will be visual impact. Surveys from Germany and 
Denmark on the effect of new windmills on the local tourist industry suggests that the 
windmills themselves could be an attraction, and thus, that the effect of an offshore wind farm 
does not necessarily have to be negative. It should, however, be noted that these surveys may 
not be directly applicable to this context, as the unspoilt nature may have a greater value for 
the tourists in this area. At the same time, it has not been documented any negative effects on 
local tourist businesses in areas with onshore windmills in Norway. 
 
Other affected parties are the local and regional governments. The NVE states that the project 
will have positive effects on employment and local businesses delivering services to the 
project both during the time of instalment and during the operation of the farm. Furthermore, 
the NVE estimates that the project through land tax alone will generate approximately 30 
million NOK per year in tax revenue to the municipality of Sandøy. Note that these positive 
effects will not be included in the CBA as the effects are not socio-economic: income to 
Sandøy is just transference between the developer and the local government, and the local 
labour could probably be utilized elsewhere. Nonetheless, the local and regional governments 
are affected parties and are therefore mentioned here.  
 
4.2 Quantifying the effects of the project  
4.2.1 Conditions and assumptions  
The estimates below will be based on the following conditions and assumptions: The time of 
reference, i.e. the starting point of the analysis, is selected to be 2012. It is not realistic to 
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assume that Havsul will be installed and in operation by the end of this year, but since it is 
unknown when this actually will be, 2012 is selected for convenience. Even though the NVE 
(2008) expects that the wind farm will be in operation for 20 years, the number of periods in 
the analysis is set to be 19, with 2030 being the final period. This is also done for convenience 
as estimates on central parameter values are available in this particular year. Following the 
NVE report the discount rate is set to be 6,5%. The reason stated by the NVE is that 
windmills are capital-intensive and because of uncertainty about the price developments in the 
market for wind turbines. 
 
We assume for simplicity that there is a unique learning curve for offshore wind power 
technology, so that spillover of learning from for example the onshore wind power industry is 
ignored. The theoretical model in chapter 3 can then be interpreted as a model for the 
European power market since development of offshore windmills is a European undertaking.  
 
Furthermore, we assume that learning is the only positive externality from the Havsul project. 
Since we use a European model we assume that the contribution of 1TWh from Havsul does 
not affect market prices and therefore not the consumer surplus either. In addition, given that 
the contribution to the regulation ability can be disregarded in this context and that the 
remaining value of the farm when production has been terminated is zero, the only benefit in 
this cost-benefit analysis is the learning externality.  
 
First the net present value of the Havsul project when learning effects are not included is 
estimated. Then it is estimated how large the benefits, i.e. the value of learning from the 
project, would have to be in order to result in a positive net present value.  
 
To obtain an estimate of the actual value of learning that Havsul will generate during the 
production period we apply the model of learning in chapter 3. Specifically, we will estimate 
the value of learning per TWh produced each year by using the expression for λ(t) (equation 
(9)) derived from the maximum principle in the previous chapter. Converting these estimates 
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into value of learning per kWh produced, these last estimates will then tell us how much value 
of learning Havsul will produce every year, for given production levels of electricity. 
Knowing now both the costs and the benefits of the project, it is possible to determine 
whether Havsul is a beneficial project or not given the applied model.  
 
All monetary units are measured in 2012 Euros and all energy units are measured in TWh 
unless specified otherwise. The selection of parameter values will be elaborated on in the 
appendix, while the sensitivity of the result with respect to some of the parameter values is 
studied in the sensitivity analysis in section 4.3.  
 
4.2.2 The net present value of the Havsul project excluding learning 
The net present value (NPV) of the Havsul project when learning effects are ignored is 
calculated as the discounted sum of revenues from the production of electricity minus 
production costs: 
(23)NPV = ∑ NlY()m() −  n()m()o ()Tpqp   
The notation of the variables and parameters is as in chapter 3, except for n and q(t). q(t) is 
the production of electricity from Havsul. Specifically, q(t) is the supply from a single 
offshore wind farm while the notation used for supply before, x(t), is the supply from the 
industry as a whole. As mentioned above, the developer of Havsul expects q(t) to be 1TWh 
each year. The cost function of a specific wind farm differs from that of the industry because 
we expect decreasing returns to scale in further wind power development. However, we 
expect there to be constant returns to scale in the electricity production of an already installed 
wind farm, so that the convexity parameter θ is equal to 1. 
 
The initial total costs of Havsul are denoted n to differentiate the costs specific for Havsul 
from the costs in the industry as a whole C0. Specifically, we assume that Havsul is the 
offshore wind power industry’s marginal project, so that the initial unit cost of Havsul 
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n() is the marginal costs for the industry -P()-#() when production is expanded with 
1TWh. The cost of producing the first unit of electricity for Havsul n is set as the present 
value of total costs, i.e. the sum of annual operation and maintenance costs, annual borrowing 
costs from an annuity loan and annual externality costs6. Due to the uncertainties in all the 
cost estimates gathered from the developer Vestavind Offshore (2012) and the NVE (2008) 
two cost scenarios will be analyzed: an optimistic low cost scenario and a more pessimistic 
high cost scenario. This gives estimates of  n equal to approximately 1,03€ and 1,59€ billion 
respectively.  
 
X(t) is the accumulated production in the industry which in every period is the sum of the 
industry’s accumulated production and actual production in the previous period, so that 
() = ( − 1) + 6( − 1). This entails that Havsul’s costs are decreasing in every period 
due to the production of electricity both by Havsul and by the rest of the industry, with a one 
period time lag. Hence, the Havsul project both contributes to and benefits from learning in 
the industry during the production period, without the developers taking this into account.  
 
The values of X(t) and the growth rate x(t) have been selected based on the following: A 
rough estimate of the accumulated production of electricity X(t) in the beginning of 2012 is 
set to be 57,05 TWh based on information from EWEA (2011, 2012). From 2012 and 
onwards, X(t) grows with x(t). The production of electricity x(t) from offshore wind power in 
2011 was according to EWEA (2012) equal to about 14TWh, and EWEA (2011) estimates 
that annual production of electricity in 2030 will be about 562TWh.  Between 2011 and 2030 
x(t) is assumed to grow exponentially with a steady rate equal to 0,194339185. This entails 
that X(t) is assumed to grow from 57,05 TWh in 2012 to approximately 2 598TWh in 2030 
and that the production x(t) in 2012 will be approximately 17TWh. We assume that the 
production of electricity from Havsul is included in this and the subsequent estimates of x(t).  
 
                                                 
6
 From visual and audible impacts. 
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It is assumed that these values of x(t) and X(t) are the optimal values both in this part of the 
analysis and in the next where the value of learning is estimated. This is obviously a bold 
assumption since it entails that the industry will produce the same amount of electricity 
irrespective of the price and cost developments. It would of course have been better to use 
estimates from a European model such as LIBEMOD, but which included learning effects. 
However, this does not exist. The effects of instead assuming that x(t) grows linearly towards 
2030 are studied in the sensitivity analysis, in addition to consequences of higher and lower 
values of x(t) and X(t) in 2030 than the EWEA estimate.  
 
The costs depend negatively on the value of the degree of learning, E. E is set as 0,1520 in the 
optimistic scenario and as 0,0439 in the pessimistic one, corresponding to learning rates of 
10% (EWEA, 2009, p.68) and 3% (BWEA, 2011, p.13), respectively. 
 
The current market price on electricity is set according to the ELIX index equal to 37 450 000 
€/TWh (Europes’ Energy portal, 2012). The two market price estimates for 2030 
corresponding to the optimistic and pessimistic scenario have been selected based on 
estimates by Golombek et al (2011). These are 85 470 000 €/TWh and 40 440 000 €/TWh, 
respectively. Between 2012 and 2030 the market prices are assumed to rise with a steady 
exponential rate. Using the current European market prices entails that we are analysing a 
model where the market price includes a sub-optimally low tax on emissions from brown 
energy. 
 
The parameter values are summarized in table 4.1. The best case scenario entails high market 
prices, low initial costs and a higher degree of learning. The worst case scenario is exactly the 
opposite, while the intermediate case is the pessimistic case with the high market price 
scenario. 
  
Parameter Best case Intermediate case Worst case 
Market prices p(t)    
2012 37 450 000,00 37 450 000,00 37 450 000,00 
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2030 85 470 000,00 85 470 000,00 40 440 000,00 
Growth rate 0,04584215151 0,04584215151 0,004267371333 
Production q(t) 1 1 1 
Initial costs rst 1 028 686 258,24 1 584 735 840,14 1 584 735 840,14 
Accumulated  
production X(t) 
   
2012 
57,05 57,05 57,05 
2030 2598 2589 2598 
Degree of learning E 0,1520030934 0,0439433476 0,0439433476 
Discount rate r 0,065 0,065 0,065 
Table 4.1: Parameter values for estimating NPV of Havsul excluding learning effects.  
 
The net present values of Havsul in the three scenarios are estimated by inserting these 
parameter values into equation (23). This yields that the Havsul project will result in a total 
deficit of approximately 4,5€ billion in the optimistic scenario, 13,7€ billion in the pessimistic 
case and 13,5€ billion in the intermediate case when learning is not included.  
 
4.2.3 Estimating the value of learning per unit of electricity 
The expression for λ(t) derived from the maximum principle in chapter 3 (equation (9)) will 
be applied to estimate the optimal value of learning per TWH produced: 
E() = ()6()% − Y() 
As before, the value of learning λ(t) is defined as the difference between marginal unit costs in 
the green industry and the total marginal costs in the brown energy industry / + 0. Here, the 
market price per TWh p(t) has been inserted for / + 0 since the market price on electricity is 
determined by the total marginal costs in the brown energy industry. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, in order to find the optimal value of learning per unit we 
need to know the optimal values on the production level x(t) and the accumulated production 
X(t), which depends positively on the value of learning. However, we can estimate the 
optimal value of learning if the sizes of x(t) and X(t) are assumed to be exogenous and 
optimal. The offshore wind industry’s current and future values of x(t) and X(t) were 
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elaborated on above, where these values were either set according to estimates by EWEA or 
deduced from their estimates, and these values will be continued to be employed in the 
calculations below.  
 
Roughly the same parameter values as in the previous section will be applied in this part of 
the analysis, except that the offshore wind industry’s values will be used instead of those of 
Havsul. Hence, the production in the industry x(t) will be employed instead of the production 
in a specific offshore wind park q(t) in the estimations. There is also the addition of the 
convexity parameter θ. The value of θ is set to 1,2 as a point of departure because it is 
unknown, and the effects of altering this parameter value are studied in the sensitivity 
analysis.  
 
The estimates of the offshore wind power industry’s value on  in the different scenarios can 
be deduced by using the information we already have. Differentiating the industry’s cost 
function (equation (1) in chapter 3) with respect to production x(t) we get 
B()
B6() =  ()6()% 
We have assumed that Havsul is the industry’s marginal project, and thus, that the initial unit 
costs of Havsul are the industry’s marginal unit costs when production is expanded with 
1TWh, so that  -P()-#() = n(). In other words, we know all the values in the differentiated 
expression, except for C0. Inserting for the parameter values and solving for C0 yields 
estimates of the industry’s C0 equal to 583 683 268,18€ in the best case scenario and 899 189 
414,62€ in the pessimistic scenario, given the exogenous values of x(t) and X(t).  
 
This leaves us with the following parameter values:  
Parameter Best case Intermediate case Worst case 
Market prices p(t)    
2012 37 450 000,00 37 450 000,00 37 450 000,00 
2030 85 470 000,00 85 470 000,00 40 440 000,00 
Growth rate 0,04584215151 0,04584215151 0,004267371333 
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Production x(t)    
2012 
17 17 17 
2030 562 562 562 
Growth rate 
0,194339185 0,194339185 0,194339185 
Accumulated  
production X(t) 
   
2012 
57,05 57,05 57,05 
2030 2598 2589 2598 
Initial costs C0 583 683 268,18 899 189 414,62 899 189 414,62 
Degree of learning E 0,1520030934 0,0439433476 0,0439433476 
Convexity θ 1,20 1,20 1,20 
Discount rate r 0,065 0,065 0,065 
Table 4.2: Parameter values for estimating the optimal learning subsidy.  
 
The value of learning per TWh produced can now be estimated by inserting the parameter 
values into equation (9) and solving for λ(t). The value of learning per kWh produced each 
year is then derived by dividing these estimates by 1 billion to transform the units from TWh 
to kWh. The value of learning per kWh each year in present value terms, and hence, the 
discounted optimal learning subsidies per kWh, are presented in table 4.3:  
 
Year Best case Worst case Intermediate case 
0 0,5189 1,2893 1,2893 
1 0,4852 1,2451 1,2436 
2 0,4546 1,2031 1,2002 
3 0,4268 1,1632 1,1590 
4 0,4011 1,1250 1,1196 
5 0,3773 1,0883 1,0819 
6 0,3551 1,0531 1,0456 
7 0,3344 1,0191 1,0107 
8 0,3151 0,9864 0,9772 
9 0,2969 0,9548 0,9448 
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10 0,2799 0,9243 0,9136 
11 0,2638 0,8949 0,8835 
12 0,2487 0,8664 0,8544 
13 0,2344 0,8388 0,8263 
14 0,2210 0,8122 0,7992 
15 0,2083 0,7864 0,7729 
16 0,1963 0,7614 0,7476 
17 0,1849 0,7372 0,7231 
18 0,1742 0,7139 0,6994 
Table 4.3: Value of learning (€/kWh) in every period (discounted). 
 
Table 4.3 shows that the discounted value of learning per kWh is decreasing over time7 in all 
three scenarios. What might seem counter-intuitive is that the value of learning per kWh is 
consistently higher in the high cost scenarios. However, this result follows from the equation 
for the value of learning λ(t) and that the same exogenous values on the industry’s production 
level x(t) and the accumulated production X(t) are applied in all scenarios. Looking at 
equation (9) from the previous chapter, repeated above, we see that larger values on the initial 
costs , and lower values on the degree of learning E and the price p(t), increases the value 
of learning, for given values of x(t) and X(t). Hence, the learning effects are more worth the 
more it costs to produce them.  
 
4.2.4 Net present value of the Havsul project including learning 
effects 
It was estimated above that the net present value of the Havsul project would be 
approximately -4,5€ billion in the optimistic scenario, -13,7€ billion in the pessimistic case 
and -13,5€ billion in the intermediate case when learning effects were ignored.  
 
                                                 
7
 This decreasing tendency is also present when the values are not discounted.  
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The value of learning generated by the Havsul project can now be estimated by multiplying 
each value of learning per kWh in table 4.3 with how many kWh Havsul is going to produce 
each year, namely 1 billion kWh. Taking the sum over 19 years we obtain the present value of 
the total value of learning produced by the Havsul project. These are 5 976 739 802,18€ in the 
best case scenario, 18 462 808 835,66€ in the worst case scenario and 18 291 778 231,41€ in 
the intermediate case.  The net present value (NPV) in the different scenarios when learning is 
ignored and the value of learning produced by Havsul are displayed in table 4.4: 
 
Scenario NPV excl. value of learning Value of learning 
Best case -4 445 004 390,45 5 976 739 802,18 
Intermediate case -13 541 825 913,51 18 291 778 231,41 
Worst case -13 712 856 517,76 18 462 808 835,66 
Table 4.4: Net present value of Havsul excluding value of learning and the actual production of value of learning 
by Havsul. Measured in € and present value terms. 
 
Comparing the two columns it is clear that the value of learning generated by Havsul exceeds 
the deficit of Havsul in all scenarios in this analysis. Hence, the benefits of the project 
outweigh the costs and the project is therefore estimated to yield a positive net present value 
when learning is included.  
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section the sensitivity of the learning estimates with respect to the values on the 
production level x(t) and accumulated production X(t) is studied. 
 
In the estimates above the instantaneous production level in the industry x(t) was assumed to 
grow with an exponential rate. If instead a linear growth rate was assumed, x(t) would grow 
with a rate equal to about 28,84 from 14TWh in 2011 towards 562TWh in 2030. Given the 
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new values of x(t) and X(t) in each period after this alteration, the NPV of Havsul when 
benefits from learning effects are ignored becomes -3 855 925 288,06€, while the actual 
production of learning would have a value equal to 5 322 892 509,2452€ in the best case 
scenario. The equivalent estimates in the worst case scenario is -13 191 856 490,36 
€ and 18 080 808 540,97€ respectively. In both scenarios both the NPVs and the sum of the 
value of learning from Havsul is reduced compared to the original estimates, but the benefits 
from learning still exceed the costs of electricity production. 
 
The production level in the industry x(t) in 2030 was set equal to 562TWh based on an 
estimate by EWEA. If instead this estimate of x(t) was one half of this figure or twice as large, 
the conclusion above would not be altered. Re-estimating when assuming that only half of 
this production has incurred by 2030 entails an exponential growth rate of x(t) equal to 
0,157857755. The new NPV of Havsul excluding value of learning in the optimistic scenario 
then becomes -4 550 662 031,67, which is only slightly lower than the equivalent estimate in 
the original specification. The actual value of learning generated is 5 790 352 879,18€. In the 
pessimistic scenario, the deficit of Havsul without benefits from learning is 
 -13 807 188 274,27€, while the present value sum of learning is worth 17 542 082 523,71€.   
 
If we instead assume that twice as much is being produced in 2030, x(t) would grow 
exponentially with a rate of 0,230820616. The NPV is then -5 402 210 800,52€ when 
ignoring learning effects, while the production of learning is worth 6 160 293 239,53€. The 
equivalent estimates in the worst case scenario is -14 432 581 737,42€ and  
19 442 670 466,90€.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
The intention in this chapter has been to estimate the socio-economic benefits from spillover 
of learning in the production of renewable energy. Indeed, the resulting estimates above 
suggest that the value of learning in the offshore wind power industry may be significant.  
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It may be that the learning effects are exaggerated in this model since we have reformulated 
the learning curve function to include learning in the actual production of green electricity and 
not in the investment in the green technology. The selected values on the degree of learning E 
is deduced from learning rates defined as the percentage of cost reduction per installed 
capacity, and this may also contribute to an excessive learning effect. At the same time, other 
relevant benefits have not been included. The applied model is a model of the European 
power market, but cost- benefit analyses are carried out in national contexts where other 
benefits such as increased consumer surplus due to affected prices and benefits from the 
regulation ability also are included. This would probably be the case regarding Havsul and the 
relevant region. 
 
As already noted, the boldest assumption in the above is that the values deduced from EWEA 
on the offshore wind power industry’s production level x(t) and the accumulated production 
X(t) were the optimal ones. A necessary condition for these values to be the optimal values is 
that the conditions from the maximum principle in chapter 3 are fulfilled.  
 
The transversality condition (equation (8)) requires that the value of learning in present value 
terms E()A is decreasing and approaches zero in the limit. We do find that the value of 
learning as derived by the expression for λ(t) (equation (9)) is decreasing when the estimates 
are discounted, displayed in the first column in table 4.5. Regarding the differential equation 
from the maximum principle in the previous chapter (equation (12)), we find that when we 
insert for the parameter values the growth rate of the value of learning is positive in all 
periods and that it is decreasing in general except for in period 1. This is shown in the third 
column in table 4.5. Hence, we find that the discounted value of learning is decreasing in 
every period, but that the optimal growth rate given the same parameter value actually is 
positive. This implies that the values on x(t) and X(t) applied in this analysis are not optimal.  
 
Year λ(t) derived from 
the first order 
λ(t) derived from 
the differential 
 The growth rate of 
λ(t) given the 
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condition  
(equation (9))  
equation  
(equation (12)) 
differential equation 
(equation (12)) 
0 518 879 079,68 518 879 079,68 12 722 782,20 
1 485 150 679,36 499 731 728,40 13 096 375,54 
2 454 643 876,99 481 923 134,78 13 085 863,60 
3 426 758 231,84 465 076 876,18 12 846 585,06 
4 401 071 237,94 448 957 880,44 12 469 434,67 
5 377 272 644,64 433 415 983,51 12 010 187,15 
6 355 126 494,00 418 354 098,79 11 504 296,95 
7 334 447 936,00 403 709 271,51 10 974 886,19 
8 315 088 424,26 389 440 916,06 10 437 297,64 
9 296 925 910,53 375 523 266,31 9 901 809,84 
10 279 858 148,59 361 940 402,42 9 375 318,98 
11 263 798 002,26 348 682 908,82 8 862 414,99 
12 248 670 084,59 335 745 595,21 8 366 089,35 
13 234 408 304,43 323 125 927,40 7 888 211,81 
14 220 954 045,27 310 822 941,52 7 429 858,06 
15 208 254 793,41 298 836 492,97 6 991 538,89 
16 196 263 090,51 287 166 740,00 6 573 362,79 
17 184 935 724,01 275 813 793,60 6 175 152,67 
18 174 233 093,88 264 777 485,90 5 796 530,60 
Table 4.5: The size and growth rate of the value of learning in the best case scenario. In € and present value 
terms. 
 
Furthermore, if the values of x(t) and X(t) where the optimal values, one should in principle 
obtain the same estimate of the value of learning λ(t) when the equation for λ(t) (equation (9)) 
is applied (first column in table 4.5) and when the differential equation with numerical 
integration is applied. Numerical estimates of the value of learning using the trapezoid 
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method8 is displayed in the second column in table 4.5. Comparing the first column and the 
second column in table 4.5, we see that the values do not correspond. This also implies that 
the values of x(t) and X(t) employed in this analysis are not the optimal ones.  
 
Since Havsul is a Norwegian project, a relevant question is to what extent the value of 
learning is covered through the common market for green certificates between Norway and 
Sweden. This arrangement was implemented on the first of January 2012 and entails that all 
producers of green energy are granted certificates equal to their supply of electricity, while the 
end-consumers are obligated to purchase these certificates. This means in practice that the 
certificates appear as an extra expense on the consumers’ electricity bills as a “green” 
percentage of their total electricity consumption.  
 
According to Svensk Kraftmäkling (2012), the prices on certificates has been in the range of 
15,77 - 16,69 €/MWh in the first three months of 2012. Hence, given these prices and an 
annual production of 1TWh, the extra income to Havsul from this arrangement would be 
approximately 15 770 000 – 16 690 000€ a year. Taking the discounted sum over 19 years 
yields a total subsidy of about 180 289 994,85 - 190 807 863,93€. Comparing with the 
estimates on the value of learning generated by the Havsul project in table 4.4, we see that the 
production of learning in this specific model is not compensated through the market for green 
certificates. We note at the same time that the stated prices may not be representative for the 
long run market price on certificates as the sample of average monthly prices is only three.  
 
                                                 
8
 Details are provided in the appendix.  
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5 Conclusion  
 
In this thesis an attempt was made of estimating the socio-economic benefits from spillover of 
learning in renewable energy industries, and including these learning effects in a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). Based on optimal control theory and the concept of learning curves a 
theoretical model of learning was developed in chapter 3. In this model, the value of learning 
was set as the shadow price on the accumulated production, reflecting the increase in the 
present value of welfare when the accumulated production increased marginally.  
 
The results from the theoretical model was applied in a cost-benefit analysis of the Norwegian 
offshore wind power project Havsul I in chapter 4. We found that the Havsul project would 
result in a negative net present value when benefits from learning where ignored in the CBA. 
By estimating the value of learning produced by the offshore wind power industry the next 19 
years per unit of electricity, it was deduced that an offshore wind project like Havsul would 
produce learning worth are 5 976 739 802,18€ in the best case scenario, 18 462 808 835,66€ 
in the worst case scenario and 18 291 778 231,41€ in an intermediate case, for given 
production levels. By comparing the costs and benefits of the Havsul project in the different 
scenarios, the project was estimated to yield a positive net present value in the CBA when 
learning was included, given the model specification.  
 
It is not a simple task to estimate the optimal value of learning as in order to deduce this 
value, the optimal values on the production level x(t) and the accumulated production X(t) are 
required. As discussed in the end of chapter 4, it is likely that the values applied in this 
analysis are not the optimal values. Nonetheless, the resulting estimates suggest that the value 
of learning in new green technology industries may be significant. This is to some extent 
verified in the sensitivity analysis in the last chapter.  
 
Some final remarks regarding some of the assumptions on which the model and the resulting 
estimates are based on will now be made. First of all, throughout this thesis it has been 
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assumed that the spillover of learning has been complete. Although this is an unrealistic 
assumption, these effects do exist at least to some extent as noted in chapter 2. The value of 
learning reflect a socio-economic value, and a smaller degree of spillover therefore implies a 
smaller learning subsidy since learning that does not spill over is only of value to the specific 
firm.  
 
Furthermore, the incentives for national authorities to grant learning subsidies to domestic 
projects are weakened precisely because of the spillover effects. Specifically, since 
subsidizing Havsul is like subsidizing the offshore wind power industry as a whole due the 
learning externality, the granting of learning subsidies can be compared to a voluntary 
contribution to improved environmental quality, which is a common good. As with many 
international problems, the national authorities are faced with an incentive-structure 
resembling a game of “prisoner’s dilemma”, where the safest choice is to do nothing when the 
alternative is to be the only agent contributing to the common good. However, the 
implementation of the Renewable Directive from the EU may strengthen the incentives to 
subsidize learning generated in the development of new green technologies.  
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Appendix 
On the selection of parameter values 
An exchange rate of 1€ = 7,5899NOK is applied in all instances where NOK are converted 
into Euros. In the calculations, 2012 is set as year zero and 2030 as year 18. 
 
The initial costs of the Havsul project n are estimated as the present value of total costs over 
19 years, given an annual expected production q(t) of 1TWh (Vestavind Offshore, 2012) and 
a discount rate equal to 6,5%. As explained in chapter 4, the NVE (2008) finds that this is an 
appropriate discount rate due to windmills being capital-intensive and because of uncertainty 
about the price developments in the market for wind turbines. n includes operation and 
maintenance costs, externality costs and borrowing costs from an annuity loan: 
 
The operation and maintenance costs are in the low cost scenario set as the average costs in 
the industry, which according to EWEA (2009) is 0,016€/kWh (16 €/MWh9). The equivalent 
estimate in the high cost case is 0,026 €/kWh (20 øre/kWh) according to an estimate by NVE 
(2008). The high and low values on the externality costs caused by Havsul is set according to 
NVE’s estimates on externality costs from onshore wind farms, which is between 0,00053 
€/kWh and 0,00265€/kWh (0,4 and 2 øre/kWh) (NVE, 2003), respectively. As noted in the 
sensitivity analysis in chapter 4, these estimates may be too high for an offshore wind farm 
considering the location. However, assuming zero externality costs in the best case scenario 
did not render the project welfare enhancing.  
 
The developers believe that total investment costs will be in the range of 790 524 249 and 
922 278 291€ (6 - 7 billion NOK) (Vestavind Offshore, 2012). Thus, the borrowing costs are 
estimated given an annuity loan of 790 524 249€ and 922 278 291€ in the low and high cost 
                                                 
9
 1 MWh = 1000 kWh 
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scenario respectively (with the interest rate equal to the discount rate). More specifically, total 
borrowing costs are set as the discounted value of annual instalments and interest costs.  
 
Taking the sum of these different costs yield the estimates of n equal to 1 028 686 258,24€ 
and 1 584 735 840,14€.  
 
The estimate on the accumulated production X(t) in the beginning of 2012 is deduced from 
information from EWEA (2011, 2012): The first utility scale offshore wind farm was installed 
in 2001 and produced 1TWh, and the production in the industry as of December 2011was 
14TWh. The accumulated production in 2012 is estimated by assuming that X(t) has grown 
exponentially with a steady rate between 2001 and 2011: 
  1uvℎ ∗ A3,xyz{|yy = 14uvℎ   →    6() = 6( − 1)A~+,QUQ  
Taking the sum of these estimates between 2001 and 2011 yield an estimate of X(t) in 2012 
equal to 57,05TWh. Figure 4.1 below, borrowed from EWEA (2012), suggests that this 
approximation is fairly reasonable: 
 
Figure A.1. Cumulative (and annual) offshore wind installations (MW). Source: EWEA (2012).  
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The growth rate of the accumulated production X(t) from 2012 until 2030 is the offshore wind 
power industry’s production level x(t), so that () = ( − 1) + 6( − 1). EWEA (2011) 
estimate that 562TWh will be produced by offshore wind power in 2030 and we assume that 
x(t) rises with a steady rate in the intermediate periods [2012-2030]:   
14uvℎ ∗ Ay,x3y{xz = 562uvℎ   →    6() = 6( − 1)Ay,xz3{3z  
This yields an estimate of the production level each year, including 2012, which is estimated 
to be 17TWh. We assume that the supply from Havsul is included in this and the subsequent 
values on x(t). 
 
The degree of learning E is set as 0,1520 in the optimistic scenario and as 0,04394 in the 
pessimistic one, corresponding to learning rates of 10% (EWEA, 2009, p.68) and 3% 
(BWEA, 2011, p.13), respectively. The learning rates are defined as the percentage of cost 
reduction per installed capacity. The values of E have been deduced using the learning rate-
relations in chapter 2, where the learning rate (LR) was defined as 1 minus the progress ratio 
(PR) and  PR was defined by PR=2-E. Solving (1-LR)=2-E with respect to E yields the 
estimates applied in the analysis.  
 
The current market price on electricity is set to 37 450 000 €/TWh, according with the 
European Electricity Index (ELIX) (referred to by Europes’ Energy portal (2012) on the 27/3-
12). The two market price estimates for 2030 corresponding to the optimistic and pessimistic 
scenario have been selected based on estimates by Golombek et al. (2011). These are 
85 470 000 €/TWh and 40 440 000 €/TWh, respectively (converted from 2007 dollars into 
2012 Euros). The estimates are based on a multi-market equilibrium model for the European 
electricity market called LIBEMOD, where different scenarios in 2030 are studied. The low 
price scenario selected to be employed in this analysis reflect the scenario where Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies have not become competitive by 2030 and where 
there is not CO2 tax. The high price scenario reflects that CCS has not become competitive 
and that there is a $90 CO2 tax (2007 dollars).  
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The market prices are assumed to rise with a steady rate between 2012 and 2030, following a 
trajectory given by 
 37 450 000 € ∗ e,q3{{q|3|3xzq = 85 470 000 € ↔ Y() = Y( − 1)A
Q,+U++U
U
  
 
 37 450 000 € ∗ e,|xq3xqqz3 = 40 440 000 €  ↔ Y() = Y( − 1)A
Q,QU+UQ+
U
 
 
Numerical integration 
In the discussion at the end of chapter 4 the value of learning derived by using equation (9) 
E() = ()6()% − (/ + 0) 
 is compared to the estimates of the value of learning by using the differential equation from 
the maximum principle (equation (12)): 
E.() = I()6()% − ()() 6()
%
? − I(/ + 0) 
 
As noted in chapter 3, this integral is not possible to solve analytically since we do not have 
explicit expressions for the instantaneous production level in the industry x(t), nor for the 
accumulated production X(t). However, it can be solved by applying numerical integration if 
the sizes of x(t) and X(t) are assumed to be exogenous.  
 
To solve the differential equation numerically the trapezoid rule is applied, which basically 
approximates the area below the graph of the function 
 () = I()6()% − ()() #()$% − IY() 
as a trapezoid. The area and hence the total value of learning each year is calculated by using 
the following approximation: 
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< ()B ≈pf
pf
a − (a − 1) (a) + (a − 1)2  
 
Inserting for this expression in equation (24) and rewriting, it follows that the total value of 
learning in any year τ can be determined by  
E(a) = a − (a − 1) (a) + (a − 1)2 + E(a − 1) 
This expression requires that we know the value of learning in the previous year λ(τ-1) in 
order to determine the value of learning in any period τ. This entails that we cannot use this 
expression to determine the value of learning in 2012. For this specific period, the value of 
learning is estimated by applying equation (9). The results of this numerical integration are 
displayed in table 4.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
